Summary Disposition Reversed on Motion for Reconsideration
In re Estate of Vuong, Docket No. MON-P-459-19 (N.J. Super. Aug. 28, 2024)
Quy Dinh Vuong (also known as Peter Dinh Vuong and referred to herein as “Peter”) executed his last will (“Will”) in 1984. Peter died in May 2011. His wife died shortly thereafter.
The Will named his daughter, defendant Thu Ngo (“Thu”), as executrix and directed that, after the payment of all debts, “the rest, residue and remainder” should pass to his son, plaintiff Chinh Minh Vuong (“Chinh”). In the next sentence, however, the Will expressed that Peter “kn[e]w” Chinh “will carry out my instructions for the care of [Chinh’s] mother, brothers and sisters.” These two sentences generated competing claims by Chinh and Thu as to Peter’ intent. For instance, Thu argued that the language created a trust.
The trial court ruled that the sentence about Chinh carrying out Peter’s “instructions” neither imposed a legal obligation nor sufficiently revealed an intention to create a trust. The judge instead determined that the Will only directed Thu, as executrix, to distribute the estate assets to Chinh, although the judge also found Thu had discretion about the timing of the distribution. The judge also denied Chinh’s motion to remove Thu as executrix and denied without prejudice Chinh’s summary judgment motion on his fraud, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment claims. The judge also disposed of related claims.
Both parties moved for reconsideration.
On reconsideration, the trial court concluded that the prior holding was incorrect in granting summary disposition on Peter’s alleged intent to create a trust. The Will contained ambiguities and contradictions. The judge then summarized the doctrine of probable intent. The court observed that a will may be construed to create a trust even if the word “trust” does not appear within its four corners, so long as the evidence reveals that that was the testator’s probable intent. Scarborough v. Scarborough, 134 N.J. Eq. 201, 206 (Ch. 1943).
Applying these principles and the standards for summary judgment, the judge decided that a determination about whether Peter intended to create a testamentary trust must await a hearing, at which time all extrinsic evidence could be considered.
The court noted some of that extrinsic evidence: in 2000 Peter typed out in Vietnamese a document that appears to direct the creation of a trust; Peter invoked the words “Chi Thi,” which Thu asserted should be understood in English as “Command to Implement”; in that same document, Peter expressed an intent to create a “family trust fund” for the purpose of encouraging ancestor worship, good education, marriage, and progeny, as well as “building unity among family members at large”; and in 2011, Peter wrote to his broker speaking about the formation of a trust.
The court observed that while Peter was educated as an attorney in Viet Nam before he came to this country in the mid-1970s, there was no evidence that he ever practiced law either in Viet Nam or in the United States, and if he did, that he possessed any knowledge or expertise in New Jersey probate law.
Moreover, the judge pointed out that the interpretation urged by Chinh seemed to require an assumption that Peter effectively intended to disinherit his other children despite the lack of any evidence to support that; Thu’s suggested interpretation would result in a construction that conveyed a benefit to all Peter’s children, not just one.
Lastly, Chinh argued that Thu’s arguments about the Will’s meaning were time-barred, based on R. 4:85-1. The court explained that that Rule does not apply to actions seeking an interpretation of the meaning of a last will or applications seeking instructions based on a will’s alleged uncertainty. In re Estate of Thomas, 431 N.J. Super. 22, 26 (App. Div. 2013).