Attorney-Client Relationship Not Found Where Purported Client Signed Engagement Letter with “N/A”
Miranda v. Rinaldi, Docket No. A-3780-22, 2024 WL 4356344 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Oct. 1, 2024)
This case tests the limits of the duties that attorneys owe to non-clients, in the context of legal malpractice.
The decedent died in 2017. He left three children: plaintiff John; Victor; and Maria. The decedent’s will named Maria as the sole beneficiary and executor. John and Victor sought to contest that will.
Victor retained the defendants/lawyers (“Law Firm”) to represent him and John to contest the will. The Law Firm sent a retainer agreement to Victor and John and asked them to sign and return it. Only Victor did so; John’s signature line was crossed out and replace with “N/A”.
In September 2017, the Law Firm sent a letter to the Morris County Surrogate, stating that it represented John and Victor and asking about the status of the will. Victor and John were copied on the letter.
A problem arose because the decedent was deemed to have in fact resided in Bergen rather than Morris County, and the will had been probated in Bergen County. In January 2018, the Law Firm filed a complaint on behalf of Victor to challenge the will. John was not named as a plaintiff. An accompanying letter advised that the Law Firm represented Victor.
In September 2018, John sought to intervene in that litigation through another lawyer (“Lawyer 2”), who had represented him in various matters for a number of years.
However, the complaint was dismissed as untimely under R. 4:85-1 because it was filed four months after the probate of the will.
John and Victor then filed a malpractice action against the Law Firm, for the failure to file the will contest in a timely fashion. Victor’s claims were settled, but John’s claims persisted.
During discovery in the malpractice action, John testified that after his father passed away, he retained Lawyer 2, who sent a letter on his behalf to Victor and Maria in August 2017, stating that John had not received any notice of the Bergen County proceedings or a copy of the will. In response, Maria sent a notice of probate.
John also testified in his deposition that he had been represented by Lawyer 2 for 23 years. He also stated that he never went to the Law Firm’s office with Victor and never entered into a retainer agreement with the Law Firm, and was never represented by the Law Firm in the will contest.
The Law Firm moved for partial summary judgment. John opposed the motion with a certification that seemed inconsistent in certain respects with his deposition and stated that Victor indicated to John that the Law Firm advised that only one firm was needed to represent both John and Victor in the will contest. John admitted that he did not sign the retainer agreement with the Law Firm but asserted that he did not insert the “N/A” into that agreement.
The trial court granted the Law Firm’s motion, on the basis that the Law Firm did not owe a duty to John because John was not a client and even as a non-client was too remote from the Law Firm to be owed a duty. The trial court also observed that John did not complain when the will contest by the Law Firm was filed only for Victor, and at the same time John had experience with retaining legal counsel and in fact had been represented by Lawyer 2 for a number of years. The judge also found a lack of evidence that John was relying on the Law Firm to represent him.
John appealed.
The Appellate Division began its analysis by observing that whether a duty exists is a matter of law to be decided by the court, and recognizing the limitations of that duty in the lawyer-client context:
“The question of whether a duty exists is a matter of law to be decided by the court.” Davin, L.L.C. v. Daham, 329 N.J. Super. 54, 73 (App. Div. 2000). Traditionally, the existence of an attorney-client relationship creating a duty is “essential to the assertion of a cause of action for legal malpractice.” Froom v. Perel, 377 N.J. Super. 298, 310 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 145 N.J. 395, 416 (1996)). Although courts have recognized a duty between an attorney and a non-client “in limited circumstances,” Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 435 N.J. Super. 198, 213 (App. Div. 2014), our Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that “the grounds on which any plaintiff may pursue a malpractice claim against an attorney with whom there was no attorney-client relationship are exceedingly narrow,” Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 458 (2013), and whether such a “duty extends to non-clients is ‘necessarily fact-dependent,'” Estate of Albanese v. Lolio, 393 N.J. Super. 355, 368 (App. Div.2007) (quoting Estate of Fitzgerald v. Linnus, 336 N.J. Super. 458, 473 (App. Div. 2001)).
As such, there are “relatively few situations” in which “a nonclient may file suit against another’s attorney.” LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 101 (2009).
Id. at *6.
The Appellate Division explained that, in determining whether a duty exists, the courts must identify and weigh: the relationship of the parties; the opportunity and ability to exercise care; and the public interest in the proposed solution. The determination of the existence of a duty is ultimately a question of policy and fairness.
Applying those concepts to this case, the appeals court found that no duty existed between John and the Law Firm:
Although defendants held themselves out as [plaintiff John’s] attorneys in the two September 2017 letters and in communicating with [Lawyer 2], plaintiff’s deposition testimony indisputably demonstrates that plaintiff did not rely on those communications and did not believe that defendants represented him. Plaintiff testified that he “would never have signed any [retainer] agreement with anyone other than . . . [Lawyer 2],” his “[o]ngoing” attorney for at least “[23] years.” Plaintiff also testified that he “never went up to [defendants’] office” with Victor, “never entered into a retainer agreement with [defendants],” and was “never represented [by defendants] in the probate case.”
Id. at *7.
The Appellate Division noted the facts raised by John in his certification opposing summary judgment, but it remained undisputed that John never signed a retainer agreement with the Law Firm and was not named as a plaintiff in the complaint filed by the Law Firm.
Further as to John’s certification, the appellate judges explained that the party opposing summary judgment:
“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Triffin v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 372 N.J. Super. 517, 523-24 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992)), and must “do more than ‘point[] to any fact in dispute’ in order to defeat summary judgment,” Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 479 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Brill, 142 N.J. at 529). “Competent opposition requires ‘competent evidential material’ beyond mere ‘speculation’ and ‘fanciful arguments.’ Hoffman v. Asseenontv.com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 426 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Merchs. Express Money Order Co. v. Sun Nat’l Bank, 374 N.J. Super. 556, 563 (App. Div. 2005)). We are satisfied that there are no genuine issues of material facts in the record that would preclude summary judgment.
Id. at *8.
In the end, therefore, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court ruling that there were no genuine issues of materials fact as to the Law Firm not owing a duty to John.