The Stranger to the Adoption Doctrine: Adult Adoptee Excluded from Class Gifts Made by Adoptive Parent’s Parents Due to Lack of Specific Intent
In the Matter of 1979 Inter Vivos Tr. of Alfred & Mary Sanzari, Grantors, Dated June 1, 1979, No. A-3612-21, 2024 WL 3249366, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 1, 2024)
This case involved a dispute over the inclusion of Carl Sanzari (“Carl”), an adopted adult, as the beneficiary of two inter vivos trusts created by Alfred Sanzari (“Alfred”) and Mary Sanzari (“Mary”). Alfred and Mary had established the trusts for the benefit of certain family members, including their deaf and legally blind son, Ben Sanzari (“Ben”), and his children.
Alfred and Mary established the first trust in 1979 (the “1979 Trust”). Thereafter, in 1994, Alfred created the second trust (the “1994 Trust”). Both trusts were funded with real property and other assets from Alfred’s real estate business.
At the time the 1979 Trust was established, Ben had three biological children with his then-wife, Barbara. By the time the 1994 Trust was created, Ben and Barbara shared a fourth biological child together. Each trust provided for residuary gifts to Ben’s children at Ben’s death. If a child was not alive but was survived by issue at the times fixed for distribution, the deceased child’s share passed to that child’s then-living issue under the terms of both instruments.
In defining Ben’s children and more remote descendants for purposes of the class gifts, the trusts provided that the words “child”, “children”, and “issue” included adopted children. Specifically, the 1994 Trust stated, in relevant part, “‘As used herein, wherever th[e] context requires or permits . . . the words ‘children’ and ‘issue’ shall include adopted children as though they were Settlor’s natural born children and/or issue.’” Id. at *5. The 1979 Trust included a similar provision, which stated, “‘All references herein to ‘issue’, ‘child’ or ‘children’ shall be deemed to refer only to issue, child or children born of lawful wedlock or legally adopted.’” Id. at *6. However, neither instrument expressly addressed whether Alfred or Mary intended for the terms “child”, “issue”, or “children” to include an adult subsequently adopted by Ben.
In 2002, Carl’s mother, Karina, began working as a nursing assistant for Alfred and Mary. Karina continued in that capacity until mid-2005.
Shortly thereafter, in late 2005, Alfred passed away. Prior to his death, Alfred had interacted with Carl–then a minor–roughly five times and knew Carl only as his nursing assistant’s son.
In 2007, Karina became Ben’s aide and housekeeper; she introduced Ben to Carl.
Barbara divorced Ben that same year, in December 2007. Approximately six months after the divorce, Ben married Karina and Carl moved in with them. Before marrying, Ben and Karina entered into a prenuptial agreement in which Karina waived any interests in the trusts or trust property. Ben and Karina also agreed that each of them was free to provide for their respective children in their estate plans (i.e., Ben for his four biological children and Karina for Carl) “‘without consideration of interests or claims of the other spouse.’” Id. at *8 (quoting terms of prenuptial agreement).
Mary passed away in February 2010.
In October 2017, Ben, at age 70, adopted Carl, who was eighteen at the time.
The trustees subsequently brought two declaratory judgment actions—one with respect to each trust—against Ben and Carl, seeking to have Carl excluded from the class gifts intended for Ben’s children.
Following the close of discovery, Ben and Carl moved for summary judgment. They argued the trusts’ language was unambiguous and Carl was a beneficiary under the “adopted child” provision included in both trusts, thereby obviating any need to determine the probable intent of Alfred and Mary. The trial court rejected that argument and found that genuine issues of material fact existed as to probable intent, noting that the scrivener of the 1994 Trust had testified, based upon his discussions with Alfred and Mary, that “they ‘did not want anyone who is not a blood relative of the Sanzari family to control any of the real estate then owned or thereafter acquired by the [t]rusts.'” Id. at *11 (alteration in original).
Separately, the trial court further concluded that New Jersey’s “stranger to the adoption” doctrine established a presumption that Carl, as an adult adoptee, was excluded from the class gifts under the trusts, and shifted the burden at trial to Ben and Carl to provide evidence of Alfred and Mary’s probable intent to include Carl as a beneficiary.
During the course of the proceedings, Ben testified Carl spent time with Mary every weekend and frequently went out to eat with her prior to her death. Ben further testified Mary was “‘affectionate’ toward Carl, always greet[ing] him good morning and hug[ging] him,’” and alleged Mary “told Carl she loved him.” Id. at *8 (alterations in original).
Additionally, Ben testified Mary treated Carl as if he were one of her own grandchildren, as evidenced by a 2009 Christmas distribution to Carl from the 1979 Trust. However, on cross-examination, Ben conceded he was the one who requested the distribution be made to Carl, and that the trustee, not Mary, had honored his request and executed the distribution check. Further, Carl admitted he was unaware of what, if any, involvement Mary may have had relative to the distribution.
At trial, Ben testified for the first time that in December 2009 (when Mary was gravely ill) he told her that he wanted Carl to be included in the trusts and she agreed. Ben further claimed Mary was the only person with whom he had spoken around that time about adopting Carl or including him in the trust. Significantly, Ben conceded at trial that his father would only give an interest in his business to someone who was “sufficiently connected with the Sanzari family.” Id. at *6.
After Ben and Carl presented their case at trial, the trustees moved for judgment under R. 4:37-2(b). The trial court granted the trustees’ motion. Ben and Carl appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment and in granting the trustees’ motion.
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court. It determined that the plain language of both trusts referred only to adopted “children,” a term which, both in and out of the legal context, is generally defined as individuals who have not yet reached the age of majority. The Appellate Division also observed that Ben and Carl had failed to provide any evidence regarding Alfred’s or Mary’s purpose in including the term “adopted children” in both trusts. As a result, the Appellate Division found the trial court did not err in denying summary judgment.
The Appellate Division also found that the trial court properly applied the stranger to the adoption doctrine. While noting that the judicially-created doctrine was abrogated by the legislature as it relates to minors, the Appellate Division observed that, in the context of adult adoptions, a statutory and judicial presumption still arises that an adopted adult cannot inherit property from someone other than the adult’s adoptive parent unless the instrument at issue expressly shows an intent for the adopted adult to receive such property. In doing so, the Appellate Division cited several cases that applied the doctrine to exclude an adopted adult as a beneficiary and explained how adult and child adoptions are two different processes under New Jersey law, with different requirements, purposes, and ramifications. The Court quoted In re Estate of Nicol, 152 N.J. Super. 308 (App. Div. 1977), which outlined the rationale of the doctrine as applied to adults and stated:
It is one thing to ascribe to a testator a contemplation of the possibility of that which has come to be relatively commonplace, namely, the adoption of a child at some time in the future by a member of the family or other relative, or any other prospective beneficiary under a will. Frequently, in such cases, the child is acquired in infancy, although the child may be older where a spouse adopts a stepchild. In both instances, however, the child is reared as one’s own by the adopting parent and is recognized as such among the family and friends.
But it is quite another matter where the adopted person is an adult . . . One would be hard-pressed to ascribe to a testator, in the absence of any expression thereon or of clarifying attendant circumstances, a probable intent to include an adopted adult among the children or issue of a testamentary beneficiary. It is extremely unlikely that a testator would foresee the likelihood that his or her child, or any other prospective beneficiary, might at some time in the future adopt an adult. It is equally improbable that an adopted adult would be embraced in the bosom of the family members other than the adopting parent, as would an adopted child.
Id. at *15 – *16.
Ultimately, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial court that the plain language of the trusts did not evidence Alfred and Mary’s intent to include adult adoptees. Nor were there any surrounding circumstances to suggest that Carl was to be included in the class of Ben’s children.
The Appellate Division likewise affirmed the trial court’s decision that Ben and Carl had failed to meet their burden of proof with respect to probable intent. Significantly, Ben and Carl were unable to provide any testimony relative to the meaning of the term “adopted children” under either trust instrument; the record showed Alfred only knew Carl as his nurse’s assistant’s son at the time Alfred passed away; as Ben conceded, the 2009 Christmas gift to Carl was made by the trustee of the 1979 Trust at Ben’s request; and Mary did not update her Will or establish a trust to include Carl, even though he was known to her and she had made bequests to, and established trusts for, all her biological grandchildren.